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Reporting on selective voices of resistance: secularism, class and 
Islamist rap  	
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Abstract 
Since the 2010-2011 popular uprisings that swept the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), rap music has served commentators to channel stories of disenfranchisement 
and oppression among the region’s youth. Accounts that portray rappers as significant 
political actors, however, reproduce narratives of resistance that focus on opposition to 
governance but overlook social inequalities. Further, the case studies of two Moroccan 
rappers illustrate that commentators value criticisms of social inequalities as long as 
they are not framed with a religious ethos. Term such as Islamist rap serve to discredit 
dissent proving that when it comes to reporting on Moroccan rap, journalists and 
academics disregard local expressions of grievance more related to class issues than to 
modes of governance. Through discourse analysis, open-ended interviews and 
ethnography (2011-2015), this paper states the urgency to shed light on important 
voices of social and political dissent silenced due to a disregard for class biases.  
Keywords  
Islamist, rap, MENA, Morocco, resistance, ‘Arab Spring’, secularism. 
Diverse ideological and political underpinnings shape cultural production in Morocco. 
These are related to the three main cultural patrons: the monarchy, Islamists groups, and 
leftists secular liberal groups.1 While alliances between Islamists and secular liberal 
groups have taken place in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, it is 
undeniable that the relationship between these groups is still difficult (Cavatorta, 2009: 
141). In Morocco, while Islamists groups have a large number of followers, leftists 
liberal secular groups’ power resides in the fact that even if smaller in number they are 
often run by members of the French educated elites (Cavatorta, 2009: 148). In the 
aftermath of the 2010-2011 uprisings that swept the MENA region, the field of culture 
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has embodied these power relations between monarchy, Islamists and secular liberals 
through reports on rap music in newspapers, magazines, and the work of some 
academics that have shaped rappers’ songs to approach them to particular ideologies 
and depict them as the dominant voices of opposition in the MENA region. The case of 
rap music in a postcolonial setting and a Muslim majority country like Morocco 
presents an opportunity to disclose within a Cultural Studies approach how narratives of 
cultural resistance cater to Western audiences mainly channelling opposition to 
governance but ignore class struggles.  
The contention between which are the significant themes and which are not is 
also present in rap music prompted by the emergence of political or conscious rap in the 
United States between 1987 and 1994. Since then, a good versus bad binary has created 
expectations that rap should focus on ‘socially conscious discourse’ (Watkins, 2005: 21) 
in opposition to ‘commercial rap’ music (See Spady et al., 1999). Rap in North Africa 
and the Middle East is no exception. However, contrary to the US, conscious rap as a 
tool of resistance is embedded within European secular liberal thought. Morocco serves 
as a case study to show that criticisms to socio-economic inequalities are only linked to 
conscious, political and therefore good rap in the region if songs do not show significant 
traces of Islamic ethos or a political Islam agenda. The fact that reports often overlook 
class biases suggests that the hegemony of these elite groups in capitalising on rap 
music to disseminate their own narratives obscure the complexities of local cultural 
fields, the power dynamics of postcolonial contexts and ultimately, voices of opposition 
that resonate with the country’s poor. 
The case studies of two Moroccan rappers support the argument of this paper. 
First, journalists have capitalised on rapper L7a9ed2 (pronounced Lhaqed and meaning 
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the enraged or outraged) – one Moroccan rapper who became known during the MENA 
uprisings – to present the case of a young conscious rapper fighting oppressive regimes. 
His personal story of oppression is highlighted due to his opposition and several 
encounters with the Moroccan state and security apparatus. Second, the case of rapper 
Muslim, pioneer of Moroccan rap and one of the most well-known artists in Morocco 
serves to show that commentators overlook stories of poverty and injustice when these 
stories are believed to be part of a political Islam agenda. Despite the fact that Muslim is 
better known than L7a9ed and from a similar socio-economic background, international 
media and some academics find him uninteresting since he does not provide with 
appealing headlines, and his lyrics are considered too religious to fit into European 
secular liberal narratives on resistance even if the rapper’s songs appeal to a large 
number of unprivileged youth.  
Methodologically, this paper takes a triple mode of research (discourse analysis, 
open-ended interviews and ethnography) approach carried out in 2011-2015 in 
Morocco. This methodology favours the identification of dominant themes of 
representation, as well as presenting a more complex picture of intents and motivations. 
Hall’s (1981) and Fairclough’s (1995: 81) understanding that in reporting news 
ideological positions are constructed while others are marginalized lays the grounds for 
this paper. This framework allows me to look at media narratives in line with dominant 
discourses on secularism and Islam, the disconnection with local artists’ discourses and 
the way their work is ‘decoded’ (Hall, 1980) by Moroccan audiences. Conceptually, 
drawing on James C. Scott (1990), Tricia Rose (1994) and John Street (2012), this 
paper engages with the idea that songs of resistance do not necessarily require an 
obvious Political aim or enemy, however, it argues that music of resistance needs to be 
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contextualised acknowledging local and global political and ideological discourses in 
determining the politics of music. 
The soundtrack of the revolution 
Since the 2010-2011 MENA uprisings, a large number of newspaper and magazine 
articles have invested in stories portraying what they consider to be the voices of the 
revolution. Much of this coverage has placed rap in the spotlight presenting rappers as 
figureheads of pro-democracy movements and explicitly pointing out rap as the music 
of the revolution (See Time (15 February 2011),3 Time Magazine (17 February 17 
2011),4 The Nation (27 August 2011)5 or the online blog Muftah (28 May 2011).6 The 
French newspaper Le Monde (11 January 2011) in an article called ‘Le rap, porte-parole 
de la jeunesse Tunisienne’7 (Rap, the Spokesperson of Tunisian Youth); The Guardian 
(27 February 2011) ‘But it took a rapper to galvanize Tunisia’s youth…’8; and BBC 
News (24 July 2011) in an article called ‘Is hip hop driving the Arab Spring?’9 and 
academic works published after 2011 have also granted a central role to rap during the 
popular upheavals (See for example Gana, 2012: 25; Howard and Hussain, 2013: 47; 
Ovshieva, 2013: 37).  
Commentators’ assumption of an artistic common political agenda in opposition 
to the state fails to capture the complexities of the region’s cultural fields. This 
assumption may be understood as part of what Lila Abu Lughod (1990) identifies as a 
tendency to look for forms of resistance and resisters. The proclivity to view rappers as 
rebellious young people is clear in two chapters of the edited collection Contemporary 
Morocco (Maddy-Weitzman and Zisenwine, 2013) where Aomar Boum and Samir Ben-
Layashi respectively homogenise and categorise rappers as a uniform group of ‘new 
	 6	
rebels’ (Boum, 2013: 174) and ‘revolutionaries and ‘anarchists’ hip-hop youngsters’ 
(Ben-Layashi, 2013: 151). Ben-Layashi in particular articulates the image of 
revolutionary youth in terms of looks and language. Rap audiences are described as 
‘modern and sometimes anarchist looks (black-t-shirts, sunglasses, tattoos, baseball 
hats)’ attributing young Moroccan with a highly complex political and philosophical 
consciousness solely based on their physical appearance. What Ben-Layashi sees as 
anarchist looks is arguably the triumph of capitalism with rappers all around the world 
wearing Nike and Adidas clothes (Chang, 2000: 25) and emphasizing a cool life style 
(Osumare, 2007: 150), or a desire to associate with a globalised hip hop culture.   
In spite of characterising rappers as ‘new rebels,’ some Moroccan rappers have 
been accused of siding with the State in times of social and political turmoil, especially 
during the demonstrations that took place in Morocco throughout 2011. Famed 
Moroccan rapper Don Bigg who had been praised for his crude lyrics denouncing social 
inequalities, became in 2011 a leading voice against the pro-democracy 20 February 
movement (20F).10 The rapper released a song and music video against this movement, 
referring to it as the ‘Party of Donkeys’. Opposite narratives where rappers are praised 
for siding with oppositional movements also emerged during this time. In an article 
published in Al-Jazeera English,11 scholar Mark Levine illustrates the story of a young 
man from Casablanca who was jailed in 2011. The article presents this man as a rapper 
praising him for his connection to the 20F movement. An unknown rapper in Morocco 
until arrested in September 2011, LeVine affirms that Mouad Belghouat –known as 
L7a9ed– is ‘one of the best Arab world rappers’. Other articles that take a similar slant 
describe L7a9ed as a ‘political rap star’ (National Public Radio 6 January 2012) 12 or a 
poet (France 24 4 April 2012).13 Similar cases of artists in the MENA region changing 
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their political narratives have also been well documented (Kraidy, 2015; Lohman, 
2009).14  
Framing rappers as co-opted State agents or revolutionary young people is, 
however, reductionist. Stuart Hall’s (1981) perception of popular culture as a battlefield, 
that is, an arena of constant and uneven struggle marked by contradictions is helpful in 
breaking from simplistic views on rap in the region. As I have argued elsewhere, 
rappers in Morocco have used both co-option and rebellion in a creative amalgamation 
by siding at times with dominant powers but also opening and broadening networks of 
participation (Moreno Almeida, 2013, 2016). Despite praising adjectives, accounts on 
rapper L7a9ed are limited to narrating the rapper’s personal story since his 
incarceration. Evidence of local audience reception of his work or the rapper’s artistry 
(punchlines, flow, lyrics, rhymes etc.) is absent from these articles. The focus on stories 
where artists are imprisoned by oppressive regimes is in line with Claire Bishop’s 
(2012) claims that the social component of art is celebrated over artistic experiences. In 
this sense, these accounts consider the mere act of producing a rap song and being 
persecuted for it an act of resistance. In an attempt to describe L7a9ed’s significance, 
LeVine refers to his music as ‘highly politicised.’ One needs to question, what does 
political mean in this account and why is L7a9ed exceptional? Highly problematic good 
versus bad debates take place without drawing on the opinions of audiences, and yet, 
the voices of the journalist or scholar are clearly articulated. The next section addresses 
these questions to show how L7a9ed’s story has been decontextualized and reshaped to 
fit into a narrative that caters to Western media audiences and Western liberal 
secularism.   
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The good rapper  
On 9 September 2011, young Mouad Belghouat was accused of attacking an organizer 
of an anti-20F group, detained, and imprisoned for four months. 15  Unknown in 
Morocco’s cultural scene until then, international media headlines began referring to 
Mouad, using his stage name L7a9ed, as a rapper and leading readers to believe that his 
detention was connected to his music production.16 Months later, on 11 May 2012, 
Moroccan authorities arrested L7a9ed again.17 This time he was accused of using 
images judged as offensive in a YouTube music video of his song ‘Klab Dawla’18 
(Dogs of the State) (2010), a collaboration with rapper Proof 3askri. The original video 
which represented the Moroccan police as donkeys has since then been deleted19 
although another	one	reproducing the image for which L7a9ed was sentenced to prison 
is still available.20 In the track, L7a9ed and Proof 3askri denounce police abuse 
describing how young people in Morocco are affected by police profiling emphasising 
the importance of the socio-economic background in these actions. Despite this song’s 
theme, expressions of discontent with the state are allowed in Morocco as long as they 
do not cross any of the country’s ‘red lines’, which are criticism to the monarchy, 
questioning Islam, or challenging Morocco’s territorial integrity, especially regarding 
sovereignty over the Western Sahara. Despite the fact that L7a9ed has crossed these 
lines in other songs, this is not the case for ‘Klab Dawla.’  
The fact that his arrest is not related to his music, but to his militancy in a social 
and political movement is well grounded. To start with, the song ‘Klab Dawla’ was 
originally released in 200821 and was uploaded to YouTube and to a Skyrock blog22 on 
October 2010. The song thus existed well before his arrest on May 2012. Secondly, 
L7a9ed has always insisted that he was not behind the disparaging images in the music 
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video.23 Thirdly, in Morocco, a moderate criticism of the police is allowed, as evidenced 
by songs where rappers championed by the State, like Don Bigg and H-Kayne condemn 
police oppression. This criticism is also visually evident in the official music video of 
Don Bigg’s track ‘Mabghitch’24 (2011) (I Don’t Want To) that shows a wall bearing the 
message ‘Fuck the police.’ None of these rappers have ever been arrested for these 
songs. The question is, why L7a9ed and not the others? The Moroccan French language 
magazine TelQuel asked this in an editorial dedicated to L7a9ed.25 I argue that there are 
two main differences: one, none of the well-known rappers by mid-2011 openly 
supported the 20F; and two, in 2011, H-Kayne and Don Bigg were empowered artists 
with large fan bases supported by some sectors of the secular civil society and by the 
Moroccan state. The arrest of any established artists in the midst of 2011 social unrests 
could have dangerously intensified popular demonstrations with young fans taking the 
streets in support of renowned artists and hence causing even more discontent in the 
country. The fact that L7a9ed was detained a third time accused of illegally scalping 
tickets for the Casablanca football derby further supports the idea that the State was 
targeting this rapper, and thus, showing its persecution against members of the 20F.26  
The idea that this case was a warning to more established rappers with many 
more followers of what could happen to them if they joined the pro-democracy 
movement cannot be discarded. Within the first weeks of February 2011, some rappers 
including H-Kayne had announced their support for the call to demonstrate on 20 
February –what would be the germ of 20F movement– through their Facebook page.27 
Days after the demonstration, local news websites were already reporting on other 
rappers from the Casablanca crew Thug Gang, Koman and Philo, as the voices of the 
movement because they had released the song ‘Ta3bir Chafawi’ (Oral Expression) in 
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support of the protesters. As Philo said in our interview, this was an old song 
denouncing social injustice that they thought would help to support the 20 February 
demonstrations.28  However, once Koman and Philo claimed not to speak for the 
movement, journalists stopped calling. While these rappers support the pro-democracy 
outcry of Moroccan society, they did not want their songs to be associated solely with a 
movement. Another rap crew called LBassline, who at the beginning had also openly 
declared its affiliation of the movement, later retracted.29 Rappers not wanting to be 
trapped within this new social movement was not surprising in a country where youth 
look at the political system and civil society with mistrust. Indeed the State’s narrative 
demonizing the 20F also proved to be effective in convincing the population that the 
movement’s aim was to divide the country and, after the new constitution approved in 
July 2011, it was no longer necessary.30 In addition, by the time of L7a9ed’s first 
detention in September 2011, the 20F had lost much of its political momentum and was 
deeply affected by internal differences (Belghazi and Moudden, 2016). Scepticism on 
the 20F was asserted by rapper Muslim, who released a freestyle song in 2013 where he 
said: ‘I’m not February 20, I’m the whole year,’ pointing out that to be an activist it is 
not necessary to belong to any movement. 	
Even if L7a9ed’s discourse is class-oriented, the story is interesting because he 
has been targeted by the Moroccan security apparatus due to his relation to a movement 
that commentators have homogenously shaped as secular.31 Some academics have 
argued that the Arab Spring was a secular phenomenon (Hoffman and Jamal, 2014: 
594) where protesters ‘displayed attributes of moral secularism’ (Khalaf and Khalaf, 
2012: 7) and were ‘not dominated by unions, existing political parties, clear political 
ideologies, or religious fervor’ (Howard and Hussain, 2013: 28). L7a9ed’s arrest is 
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framed by international media headlines as part of the state’s will to halt the democratic 
process started by secular young Arab Spring protesters: ‘Rapper’s Imprisonment Tests 
Moroccan Reforms’ (National Public Radio 6 January 2012)32 or ‘Moroccans see limits 
of reform in rapper’s case’ (BBC 25 November 2011).33 This language of reforms 
brings up the idea that the region is in a constant road to democracy or return to 
authoritarianism (Cavatorta and Durac, 2011: 1). None of these articles, refer to the 
common resentment in the region against the way power, embodied by the ruling elites, 
treat the people with disdain. This class division is encapsulated in the notion of hogra, 
meaning contempt, a term frequently used across the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria and 
Tunisia) to report abuses by the elites over lower socio-economic groups. These 
commentators have focused on the language of reform as part of a democratization 
agenda framed within European liberal thought while marginalising the rapper’s 
denunciation of hogra which is part the local language of criticisms, not only to 
governance, but to class inequalities.  
The politics of Islamist rap 
The number of articles on local and foreign press concerning L7a9ed has been inversely 
proportional to those on Muslim, one of the Moroccan rappers with the largest number 
of followers. While being one of the most notable and respected rappers by young 
audiences in Morocco, French language Moroccan media outlets, independent 
documentaries on the Moroccan rap scene, independent, until recently, and state-funded 
music festivals have all systematically marginalized rapper Muslim (Moreno Almeida, 
2013). Part of the disregard for Muslim as a symbol of resistance is related to the fact 
that some consider him to be an Islamist rapper. 
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In an article in the French magazine L’Express International (June 12-18, 2013), 
the French academic Dominique Caubet, claims that Mohamed Mezouri aka Muslim is 
the main figurehead of a trend of Islamist rappers. Although Caubet identifies this 
category as a trend, she does not offer further examples of its followers or details about 
this subgenre or group. Momo, one of the founders of the music festival LBoulevard, 
refers to Muslim using this same term in an article for the Hufftington Post (May 5, 
2015): ‘il y a le rap islamiste, le rap de Muslim’ (there is Islamist rap, the rap of 
Muslim’.34 In this regard, on his online blog, scholar Yves Gonzalez-Quijano employs 
the term rap islamiste (Islamist rap), also expressed in French, to argue that it is the 
meeting point of rap and political Islam.35 This idea is reproduced by Aidi when arguing 
against the idea that hip hop culture and Islamism are opposites: ‘Islamist listen to hip-
hop, and rappers with Islamist- even jihadi- sympathies abound” (2011: 260). Scholars 
(Martin and Barzegar, 2010 edited collection is a good example of this effort) have 
questioned the validity of such broad terms, Islamism and Islamist, challenging their 
connection with political Islam, another problematic term in itself. Despite the wide 
range of meanings, Islamism and Islamist are used loosely many times as synonyms of 
fundamentalism, Jihadism or Islamic extremism (Martin and Barzegar, 2010: 2). Even if 
commentators do not precise Islamists rap in these particular terms, local ideologies 
within the political and cultural field suggest the particular connotations of using such a 
term as Muslim is regarded as Islamist but not as an engaged rapper. 
The need for these academics and cultural stakeholders to categorize rappers as 
Islamists informs us more on the fascination with categorizing and bestowing a political 
consciousness to Muslim young artists than understanding local and global social, 
political, cultural, and religious contexts. This definition of Islamist rap may fit in neatly 
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with the idea of some rappers aligning with self-declared Islamist political groups, as is 
the case of Tunisian rapper Psyco M according to Aidi (2011: 260). However, including 
in this group rappers who have never associated themselves with any form of political 
group that refer to themselves as Islamist is highly problematic, particularly in Morocco 
where political parties are generally discredited and perceived as weak (Cavatorta, 
2006: 208; Cohen and Jaidi, 2006: 72). As stated above, rappers have rarely publicly 
supported political parties or civil society associations with a political agenda.  
In fact, Muslim sees his music as part of his identity and not as part of a political 
agenda. When I asked him whether he sees himself as an Islamist rapper, he responded 
by saying: 
Muslim: [Laughing] I am not an Islamist rapper. I mean, who talks about Islamic topics and 
all that, Islam is in many things in life. If I say in my songs, don't steal don't do drugs respect 
your mom and all these things. That’s what Islam says, but I don't go deeper than that. I am 
not a preacher (Da3iya). But we still have that Islamic part of our identity. We say for 
example ‘Dounia Fania’ (The World is Ending) and we only run for money and there's a day 
when we all die and this and that, but no deeper than that, like go to pray or do similar things  
[Laughing].36 
Muslims songs and much of Morocco’s music production mostly reflect the 
significance of Islam in Moroccan society and do not necessarily indicate a political 
agenda. In using the term Islamist rap, the fact that many other rappers and music 
genres like fusion, Gnawa, Aissawa, and Andalusi, to name a few, often use religion in 
their songs is overlooked.  
Islamic faith and Arabic terms have been part of hip hop since the early 1970s, 
as they are also related to the American racial discourse (Aidi, 2011; Marable and Aidi, 
2009) with, for example, the conversion to Islam of Civil Rights Movement leader 
	 14	
Malcolm X or the creation of the Nation of Islam. Explicit references to Islam including 
salat (prayer) or zakat (alms) are in the work of American rappers such as Lupe Fiasco 
or Busta Rhymes, or French rappers like Médine. However, these rappers are not 
referred to as Islamist rappers (although Médine is often banned by the French media 
who prefer to promote Sufi rapper Abd El Malik, more in accordance with the idea of 
France as country of freedom as opposed to “3rd world oppressed countries”). God is 
very present in US rap as Tricia Rose (2008) claims rappers to be rather conservative 
despite the way they have been framed as rebellious. Juan Flores (2004: 82) cites lyrics 
that reference God in Puerto Rican rap: ‘and at night I prayed to God and the holy 
mother.’ Yet Flores does not categorise this as Christian, nor fundamentalist rap. 
Therefore, while the argument can be made that Muslim’s ethos is religious, labelling 
him as Islamist suggests a biased perception of his music, in tune with secular liberal 
narratives that demonise Islam, and depoliticise cultural production these groups 
perceive as too religious. 
Rapper Muslim’s lyrics are varied often drawing on the troubles of the nation’s 
poor such unemployment and drug and alcohol abuse. In this sense, his songs are not 
always political, but also deal with ethics and morality. One example is his song 
‘Dounia Fania’37 (The World is Ending) (2011) that revolves around the idea of people 
leaving aside the correct path and the need for religion to save the world from ending, a 
common trope in Moroccan popular imagery. As Muslim states in the second verse: 
People aren’t satisfied, nothing is enough 
we ate each other, blessing is an old word 
we lost everything good when living became expensive 
we were defeated by the devil 
	 15	
we don’t stay and listen to those who cry 
we don’t sympathize with those who suffer 
we construct around us tall walls 
Muslim ends by affirming: 
 
because it hasn’t finished, there is still an opportunity 
we have to go back to religion and learn the sacred letter. 
In this song of despair, Muslim depicts the hardship of a life where people have lost the 
right way; the rapper believes lack of morals is part of the problem.	This is the rapper’s 
most intimate song, as he told me in our interview.38 Contrary to ‘Dounia Fania,’ 
however, in the song ‘Law Kan Lwa9i3 Law7a’ (If Reality was a Canvas) (2011), 
Muslim elaborates on specific political ideas by which he would rebuild Morocco. 
Muslim suggests getting rid of bars and casinos, keeping mosques open and encourages 
women to wear a veil: 	
I would paint a long corniche without casinos or bars 
Paint many mosques open night and day 
Paint the girl of my country covering her hair with the veil  
Despite the fact that these lines directly reference Islamic precepts against alcohol and 
gambling, references to the evils of alcohol are not unique to Muslim’s narrative.  
It is important here to highlight that while this verse has been controversial, 
criticisms of Muslim have missed that in the same song the rapper also denounces the 
practice of bringing illiterate women from villages to work as maids in the cities for 
very little or no money at all:  
I would paint the last girl who was working in houses 
	 16	
And now she has books in her hand and is going to study,  
full of dignity 
Though here Muslim shows his social awareness of the suffering of the poor by 
claiming the right to an education for illiterate women, thus urging an end to their 
exploitation as he does in many other songs, Muslim is depicted only as an Islamist and 
not as a politically engaged rapper denouncing social malaise and class inequalities.  
The demonization of Islamists in Morocco is a response to the challenge that the 
rise of a party like the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) and the Justice and 
Charity group over the past 20 years poses to Moroccan ruling elites including secular 
liberal groups (Cavatorta, 2006: 216–217). While narratives that place Islam in 
contention with Western values of freedom, democracy and tolerance have been widely 
challenged (Brown, 2012; Mahmood, 2009; Massad, 2015; Nussbaum, 2012), existing 
reports reveal that Islam continues to be framed in such a manner. Scholars such as 
Cavatorta (2006), Gutkowski (2013) and Massad (2015) continue to denounce the 
hegemony of European liberalism in shaping secularism as democratic, liberal, 
progressive and tolerant, in opposition to Islam considered as undemocratic, uncivil, 
immoral, and extremist.39 Muslim’s condemnation of female exploitation is therefore 
not portrayed as progressive because he is already framed as Islamist and thus backward 
and uncivil. Because powerful secular women rights’ groups believe that Islamists are 
an obstacle to gain equal rights (Pratt, 2006: 138), the veil proves to be more powerful 
in determining Muslim’s politics than denouncing social inequalities.  
The fact that Muslim’s politics critically share the Islamist ruling party, PJD, 
values was confirmed when Muslim declared in an interview in 2014 that he had voted 
for PJD in order to bring some change to the country; however, he claimed to be 
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deceived by this party as nothing has changed.40 His feeling of deception is expressed in 
his last album Al-Rissala (The Letter) (2014), especially in the song ‘Ntouma Ghir 
Kathadro’41 (You Are Only Talk) (2014) where Muslim openly criticizes Morocco’s 
Prime Minister Abdelillah Benkirane from the PJD party. Muslim accuses Benkirane of 
being an actor and washing his hands of the country’s problems:	 
We switched on the TV and found a play of the artist Benkirane 
One-man show in the parliament 
We didn’t understand anything except that nothing is in his hands 
While Muslim’s lyrics and political ideas may be in tune with PJD’s project, the rapper 
remains as independent critical voice without blindly bolstering any political group.   
The poetics of Muslim’s rap 
Proof of Muslim’s popularity may be found looking at social media. While rappers 
favoured by the State, such as H-Kayne have barely 40k and Don Bigg half a million 
followers on Facebook, Muslim has 1.5 million. His videos on YouTube easily reach 
millions of views being the Moroccan rapper with most views in his YouTube channel. 
During my time in Morocco (2011-2015), young rap fans who I engaged with in 
conversations at concerts or other informal gatherings often referred to Muslim as a poet 
suggesting the aesthetic significance of his music for the audience. In 2012, I was at his 
first concert at Mawazine, a well-known festival with the largest audience and budget in 
the country. He performed after the rap group Fnaïre, also pioneers of the Moroccan rap 
scene. The audience in the beach of Salé, a neighbouring city to the capital Rabat, kept 
on shouting his name during the Fnaïre’s performance. When Muslim came out to 
perform, the audience engaged in singing all his songs proving their devotion to this 
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rapper. Further, even Caubet is forced to admit, ‘his [Muslim’s] discourse… is without 
a doubt the most appealing to the vast majority of the Moroccan society’ (L’Express 
International 12 June 2013, p.51). 
Muslim’s artistry and powerful message is supported by his language use, 
rhyming in Moroccan Darija, occasionally rescuing words from standard Arabic. This 
choice sets him apart from other rappers who prefer to draw on tougher street language 
varieties. He can make rhymes that they cannot.	 But Muslim has also used vulgar 
language especially in earlier songs as a way of reflecting young people’s jargon. He 
has used swear words such as m9awwed, which can translate as dope, cool, pimped or 
fucked up, frequently employed by Moroccan youth to express something they either 
regard with favour or, on the contrary, something they dislike. The word appears in an 
early track from rapper Muslim, ‘Zna9i Tanja’42 (Streets of Tangiers) (2005), in which 
he says ‘With no ups and downs I know my luck is fucked up (m9awwed)’. Despite the 
different meanings, the word is considered a swear word and not appropriate for use in 
public or in family contexts. In this sense, Catherine Miller (2012: 179) claims, the use 
of vulgar language in the public arena transgresses the unspoken code of politeness and 
often causes indignation and embarrassment. Furthermore, when swear words are 
employed, almost exclusively by men, it confers the rapper with a sense of masculinity 
and toughness. 	
The idea that swearing and cursing in the public sphere is offensive is not unique 
to Morocco. When discussing the rap scene in Tanzania, Alex Perullo (2005: 96) 
suggests that rappers, fans, and radio announcers discourage cursing in both Kiswahili 
and English, as swearing is unacceptable in public. The Turkish rap scene, on the 
contrary, employs swear words both in Turkish and English, though they are not 
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tolerated for marketing purposes since they are banned by the Turkish Ministry of 
Culture (Solomon, 2006: 5–6). In Turkey, this ban acts as a mark of distinction between 
the underground and the commercial scenes. Where those who do not include swear 
words are viable commercially, rappers who include swear words in their lyrics do not 
get their music commercially released and only have recourse to alternative means of 
distributing their music such as websites or informal record companies (Solomon, 2006: 
5–6).  
In Morocco, the Audio Visual Communication Law approved by the parliament 
in 2005 regulates the public broadcasting service forbidding the use of vulgar language. 
Therefore, when songs are broadcasted in public media, rappers must supply clean 
versions, where swear words and vulgar language have been eliminated. In this respect, 
Hicham Abkari, director of the Mohammed VI Theatre in Casablanca, has stated that 
‘nowadays, singers sanitize their speech to make it exploitable on the radio, on 
television during sponsored programs’ (Cestor, 2008). This is the case of well-known 
groups favoured by the State such as H-Kayne and Fnaïre, as above discussed, but also 
Muslim’s. Muslim’s newly mostly-sanitised language is related to increasing his access 
to different social groups and to reach a wider audiences, as he told me: 
Look, before, when we were young, we used to rap and from time to time we used to drop a 
few swear words. But then, when, you see, you figure that your music is only heard by one 
generation, but doesn't touch other people, your rap is only heard in headphones you can't 
hear it loud in your house or something, but to me this was not to my advantage. I want to be 
heard but everybody, so if I want everybody to listen to me I won't lose anything. If with this 
word means 10 people hear me, I'll change it and then 20 or 30 people will, old and young, 
in the house and wherever else. It only requires me to change a word.43  
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Though Muslim’s change in the use of swear words can be read in these lines and in 
connection with the Moroccan Islamist party conception of clean art,44 his answer 
indicates otherwise.	
Evidence to support this argument is that Muslim has not only shaped his 
language restricting vulgar words, but also altered his northern Moroccan dialect into a 
kind of koine – or common language – easier to understand by Moroccans from across 
country. Some linguists consider that the Darija variant of Casablanca and Rabat as the 
new urban koine, and see it as imposing on the rest of the country (Miller, 2007: 11; 
Moscoso García, 2002: 2), though in a latter work, Miller (2012: 180) found that this is 
not necessarily the case. In this respect, while early songs such as the above mentioned 
‘Zna9i Tanja’ (2005) used more variations of the northern region dialect, a latter song 
like ‘Dounia Fania’ (2011) is closer to this koine. A listen to the first song shows that it 
contains words found only in the north, like mdakham meaning great or good used only 
in the northern region. Also signifying his regional heritage, Muslim uses the word 
pobre, meaning poor in Spanish, in some of his songs, tagging him as a resident of the 
regions that were once under Spanish control. This sort of usage of Spanish is absent in 
the songs of rappers from other parts of Morocco. The change from vulgar to clean 
language, from dialect to koine and Modern Standard Arabic shows the willingness of 
Muslim to broaden his audience. Reaching a higher number of people has allowed 
Muslim to survive as an artist and impose himself as a central figure of the Moroccan 
rap scene despite the disinterest of media, academics, and state-funded events.  
Conclusion 
Reporting on voices of opposition requires a deep understanding of local power 
dynamics within the political and cultural fields. Overlooking rappers with which young 
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people relate, not only means that artists’ voices need to fight harder to be heard, but 
also that young people’s stories, especially those of the urban poor remain unimportant. 
The interplay of promoting only certain rappers, those that fit into certain 
epistemologies, while neglecting other popular ones does not seem to line up with the 
message of power of the people or giving a voice that many journalists, academics and 
members of the civil society seem to promote. In this endeavour, commentators have 
marginalised both L7a9ed and Muslim’s emphasis on class issues and hogra that 
resonate more with young people that on-going global debates on governance and 
religion. While secular liberal elites in Morocco clung to fighting forms of what they 
consider as political Islam, meanings of resistance which places European liberal 
secularism as the good and Islamism as the bad fails to consider the long tradition of 
narratives of opposition connected to Islam. Moreover, the epistemological stance 
whereby criticisms of poverty and inequality are not regarded as resistance while 
critiques of governance are shaped as political and conscious needs to be challenged as 
it obscure signs of politically engaged youth. Ultimately, placing Muslim as an Islamist 
rapper neglects powerful criticisms that speak to Morocco’s unprivileged youth by 
tapping into fears of an Islamist nation and, therefore, demonstrating how fighting 
poverty and inequality are only compelling when, or rather, if, they are packaged within 
a European liberal secular frame. Further, more studies that challenge widespread 
normalised definitions of resistance and critical analyses of terms such as Islamist rap 
need to engage with the role of class. Accounts on non-Western rap music need to break 
from the straightjacket of governance and to be studied for its artistry –flow, 
punchlines, beats etc.,– in its ability to shape local languages, and its role initiating and 
voicing local and global conversations on class, gender, race, etc. 
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1 See Graiouid and Belghazi (2013) for a comprehensive analysis on the contemporary cultural field in 
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2 I reproduce the names of Moroccan rappers in the way in which they spell them on their album covers 
or their official social media sites using the alphanumeric Latinized Arabic and not the Arabic standard 
transliteration. I use this transcription system as a form of respect to the authors’ choice of transliteration 
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speaking youth. 
3 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2049456,00.html [6 May 2016]. 
4 http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2050022,00.html [6 May, 2016]. 
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May 2016]. 
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tunisienne_1463638_3212.html [6 May 2016]. 
8 http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/2011/feb/27/egypt-tunisia-music-protests [2 August 2016]. 
9 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14146243? [2 August 2016]. 
10 The 20F movement was born in the context of the 2010-2011 uprisings demanding political and socio-
economic changes which included calls for better political and social rights, free education, better prices 
for basic products, and decent wages. 
11 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/06/2012626133253231919.html [27 May 27 2016] 
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ue%29 [3 July 2016]. 
16  One example is this BBC article entitled ‘Moroccans see limits of reform in rapper’s case’ 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15877251 [3 July 2016]). 
17  http://www.france24.com/fr/20120425-justice-maroc-rappeur-mouad-belghouat-rancune-liberte-
expression-mouvement-20-fevrier [3 July 2016]. 
18 See video at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EAyZ7R5xmvk [7 September 2016]. 
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24 See video at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D3GMgKehhk0 [26 August 2016]. 
25 http://telquel.ma/2012/02/01/ce-maroc-la_329 [27 May 2016]. 
26 http://www.marocpress.com/fr/aufaitmaroc/article-95329.html [3 July 2016]. 
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Meknes, 2 July 2011).  
28 Saad Lemgaddar (Philo). Interview by the author. Casablanca, 8 May 2013. 
29 While the rap group LBassline declared their commitment to the 20F on January 2013, they announced 
through their Facebook page on 8 July that year that they did not belong to it. 
30 In Moroccan journalist Ahmed Benchemsi’s account of the 20F, protesters started to diminish by mid-
May 2011 (http://ahmedbenchemsi.com/feb20s-rise-and-fall-a-moroccan-story/ [7 September 2016]). 
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2016]. 
33 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15877251 [8 May 2016]. 
34  http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2015/05/17/rap-momo-lboulevard_n_7292872.html [2 September 
2016].  
35 http://cpa.hypotheses.org/3237 [2 September 2016]. 
36 Mohamed Mezouri (Muslim). Interview by the author. Tangiers, 26 June 2013. 
37 See video at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ju_13jfI5s [3 July 2016].  
38 See note 36. 
39 This line of thought is supported by Ayhan Kaya (2014) who cites a number of surveys, polls and 
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perceptions of Muslims in Western European and North American countries. Kaya’s chapter also 
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